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A CLEANER, CRISPR CONSTITUTION: GERMLINE EDITING
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INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2017, genetic engineering once again burst into the world. On that
date, a team of international researchers published their latest experiment.1 These
researchers used CRISPR/Cas9, the newest and most controversial genetic engineer-
ing technology, to edit a portion of a human embryo.2 They succeeded in removing
a genetic heart disease, known as hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, from the embryo’s
DNA.3 Not only was this the first time researchers created a genetically modified
embryo in the United States, it was the first time researchers successfully edited the
DNA of an embryo, ever.4 The experiment had groundbreaking consequences. This
breakthrough sheds light not only on a future of cheap and safe genetic engineering,
but also a future that morphs and modifies our conception of humanity. Even before
CRISPR/Cas9, scientists and public figures warned against allowing such technology
in fear of dystopia and the advent of “designer babies.”5 CRISPR/Cas9 has made that
prospect a foreseeable reality.
CRISPR/Cas9 capabilities in gene editing deserve a constitutional conversation.
Because of the novel nature of this technology, scholarship concerning the legal
implications and constitutional dimensions of gene editing is scarce.6 Now that the
technology is at the doorstep of the United States, courts and legal scholars should
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School.
1 Pam Belluck, In Breakthrough, Scientists Edit a Dangerous Mutation From Genes in
Human Embryos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hn29ey.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id.
5 Tia Ghose, Children to Order: The Ethics of ‘Designer Babies’, LIVE SCIENCE (Mar. 13,
2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.livescience.com/44087-designer-babies-ethics.html [https://perma
.cc/P5EU-DTCZ].
6 John Attanasio discussed the constitutional dimensions of genetic engineering in general
before CRISPR/Cas9 made it a practical reality. See generally John B. Attanasio, The Constitu-
tionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal
Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274 (1986) (surveying various aspects of constitu-
tional law, including the right to privacy, as applied to genetic engineering). For a more general
discussion tailored to CRISPR/Cas9, see Teddy Ellison, Why Genetics Is CRISPR Than It Used
to Be: Helping the Novice Understand Germ Line Modification and Its Serious Implications,
26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 595 (2017).
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expand the dialogue. We should take more seriously the arguments that were once
resigned to science fiction novels. Although it may be some years before the safety and
reliability issues are seamed over, an ex ante discussion is invaluable for such con-
troversial treatments. There is good reason to believe the federal or state governments
would—at least initially—prohibit CRISPR/Cas9 germline modification. As of 2015,
twenty-nine countries, including Britain, Canada, Sweden, France, and Australia, have
banned gene editing in embryos.7 So far, the U.S. state and federal governments have
not explicitly addressed the issue.8 A revolutionary treatment, capable of removing
genetic diseases,9 could be just years away from mainstream incubation.10 So, cue
the legal inquiries: Does the right to privacy include the editing of offspring DNA?
Does it violate the future child’s autonomy? Does the individual at least retain a
substantive due process right to access medicine from private sources?
This Note argues that the individual does not retain a fundamental right in using
CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing to remove hereditary disease. Although the Supreme
Court might recognize some limited “liberty interest” in the practice, germline editing
is, regardless of this, subject to legislative regulation. We can foresee, one day, an indi-
vidual claiming a right to remove a genetic disease from her child via CRISPR/Cas9.
If she already enjoys the right to terminate the pregnancy, why should she not have
the same right in choosing its genetic disposition? The Court would have several
avenues from which to analyze her claim: the right to privacy, broader rights to indi-
vidual or minor autonomy, the right to access medicine, self-definition, etc. This
Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of those and similar claims through
various constitutional doctrines. Because gene editing through CRISPR/Cas9 creates
an unfamiliar factual background, the Court might use its precedent more as reflec-
tions of values rather than concrete rules. Ultimately, the Court would find the state’s
interest in medical regulation worthy of protection against the individual’s claim to
privacy. Citing the state’s interest in protecting public health and welfare, the Court
would uphold a legislative prohibition on the practice. Concerns with CRISPR/Cas9
do not stop at safety issues. A myriad of ethical issues engulf the procedure, including
fears of eugenics and entrenching social disparities. Those concerns, the Court would
hold, are sufficient to trump an individual’s autonomy interest in using CRISPR/Cas9.
Moreover, legislatures are in the best position to arbitrate over such unresolved
social and ethical problems.
7 Heidi Ledford, Where in the World Could the First CRISPR Baby Be Born?, NATURE
(Oct. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Ledford, Where in the World], https://www.nature.com/news/where
-in-the-world-could-the-first-crispr-baby-be-born-1.18542 [https://perma.cc/78WW-7YHP].
8 See id.
9 See Liquan Cai et al., CRISPR-Mediated Genome Editing and Human Diseases, 3 GENES
& DISEASES 244, 247 (2016). Using CRISPR/Cas9 editing, scientists prevented an HIV virus
from spreading within infected cells. See Youdiil Ophinni et al., CRISPR/Cas9 System Target-
ing Regulatory Genes of HIV-1 Inhibits Viral Replication in Infected T-Cell Cultures, 8 SCI.
REPS. 7784, 7784–85 (2018).
10 See Cai et al., supra note 9, at 249.
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Part I details how CRISPR/Cas9 editing works and highlights the difference
between somatic and germline cell edits. The following sections explain how
CRISPR/Cas9 is superior to other gene editing techniques and how it effortlessly
proliferates within the medical market. It then discusses the predominate concerns
with the technology, including safety, exacerbating inequalities, and the fear of posi-
tive eugenics.
Part II asks whether the constitutional right to privacy includes the right to edit
an embryo’s germline. The first section summarizes the right and concludes that the
Court must interpret CRISPR/Cas9 procedures through more specific elements within
the right. The next section applies the “burden” argument in abortion jurisprudence
to removing genetic defects from an embryo. The third section questions whether
there is a more inclusive right to trait selection through abortion and, if so, if that right
extends to trait selection through CRISPR/Cas9. The last section covers the strength of
a minor’s right to bodily autonomy and whether genetic engineering violates this right.
Finally, Part III considers whether the individual enjoys a right to access medi-
cal treatments from private sources. The individual, after all, could make a prima
facie case that a prohibition on CRISPR/Cas9 is unreasonable and arbitrary and that
she has a constitutionally protected choice in private medical treatment. The first
section explains how the “medical necessity” doctrine ultimately precludes gene
editing treatments. The next section reviews the Court’s history of deferring to the
state interest in protecting public health. Because there are so many public health
concerns with CRISPR/Cas9, the Court would defer to the legislature and uphold any
regulation. The last section argues that this deference approach conveniently avoids
the problem of answering whether there is a right to create disability.
I. THE CRISPR REVOLUTION
A. What Is CRISPR/Cas9?
In 2007, scientist Francisco Mojica first discovered Clustered Regularly Inter-
spaced Short Palindromic Repeats,11 making a crisp acronym. Found in immune system
bacteria, CRISPR is the bacteria’s mechanism for warding off viruses.12 When a virus
infects the bacteria, CRISPR—an internal component—keeps a piece of genetic code
from that virus.13 Now that the bacteria can recognize the virus, its immune system can
more quickly attack the virus if it reappears.14 Essential to the process, CRISPR pro-
duces an enzyme called Cas9, which can bind and cut strands of DNA from a CRISPR
11 Questions and Answers About CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org
/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr [https://perma
.cc/ZBP6-SLD5].
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
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sequence, called a “‘spacer’ sequence.”15 Scientists can modify the Cas9 enzyme to snip
pieces of the target cell’s DNA, allowing them to study gene function.16 The process
operates much like a “cut and paste” technique.17 After extracting the CRISPR se-
quence with Cas9, scientists can then “guide” the CRISPR sequence to replace specific
sequences in the DNA.18 Through CRISPR/Cas9, scientists can remove genetic dis-
orders by replacing the abnormal chromosome with an unaffected sequence.19
One of the most controversial uses of CRISPR/Cas9 is for germline editing.20
There are generally two kinds of therapy involving gene editing: somatic and germline
cell therapy.21 In somatic cell therapy, the modifications do not pass to future genera-
tions.22 The affected cells are confined to the individual.23 In germline editing, the
offspring inherits every change, and those genetic changes are passed on to future
generations.24 This kind of genetic engineering is only feasible at the embryonic stage.25
Germline editing is much more controversial than somatic cell therapy for several rea-
sons. First, many more individuals are affected.26 Unless the children change their own
genetic makeup, the changes from the initial CRISPR/Cas9 germline edit would be
present in every single individual in that family line.27 As a result, many more are at risk
of mutational side effects.28 Second, because germline editing can affect traits that
are only in DNA, this kind of treatment creates greater risks of “designer babies.”29 The
phrase implies a callous disregard for the sanctity of birth, equating newborns with
fashion accessories.
One of the most groundbreaking parts of CRISPR/Cas9 is its low cost and remark-
able accuracy.30 Prior to this technology, scientists conducted DNA editing through
15 Id.
16 See id.
17 Jon Entine, Ethical and Regulatory Reflections on CRISPR Gene Editing Revolution,
GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (June 26, 2015), https://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2015
/06/25/ethical-and-regulatory-reflections-on-crispr-gene-editing-revolution [https://perma.cc
/H298-UNTY].
18 See Sarah Ashley Barnett, Comment, Regulating Human Germline Modification in Light
of CRISPR, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2017).
19 See, e.g., A.F. Mentis, Epigenomic Engineering for Down Syndrome, 71 NEUROSCIENCE
& BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 323, 325 (2016).
20 Barnett, supra note 18, at 553.
21 Id.
22 Sarah Polcz & Anna Lewis, CRISPR-Cas9 and the Non-Germline Non-Controversy,
3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 413, 414 (2016), https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/3/2/413/1751234
[https://perma.cc/DA5K-M7C3].
23 Id.
24 Barnett, supra note 18, at 556.
25 Id. at 555.
26 See id. at 556.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 558.
29 See id. at 555.
30 Id. at 565–66.
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techniques known as zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs) and transcriptional activator–like ef-
fector nucleases (TALENs).31 However, these technologies were deficient in a number
of ways. They could only edit one genome sequence at a time, whereas CRISPR/Cas9
can edit many at once.32 They took researchers months to perform, and even then
scientists could not guarantee complete accuracy.33 CRISPR/Cas9 takes only several
weeks.34 So far, CRISPR/Cas9 has been the source of many experiments that were
“previously difficult or impossible to conduct.”35 In addition, and more importantly,
CRISPR/Cas9 reduces the cost associated with DNA manipulation to an unprece-
dented degree. Where ZFNs and TALENs cost anywhere from $500 to $5,000,
CRISPR/Cas9 is available at around $30 in most cases.36 One crafty man made head-
lines when he began producing CRISPR kits in his garage.37 The improved accuracy
and reduced cost has enormous social implications.38 Genetic engineering is no
longer a pipe dream.
B. Alternatives to CRISPR/Cas9
The advent of assisted reproduction technologies (ARTs) in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century revolutionized procreative decision-making.39 In vitro
fertilization (IVF) procedures requires a physician to remove several mature eggs
from the woman’s ovaries and fertilizes them in a laboratory.40 The physician then
implants the eggs back in the uterus, a process which takes about two weeks.41 Since
then, IVF has become “the most effective form”42 of ART. Another alternative pro-
cedure is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).43 Once a physician extracts the
mature eggs in an IVF procedure—but before he transplants them back in the
uterus—the physician can search each fertilized egg for genetic defects.44 PGD
31 Id. at 562.
32 Id. at 563.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 564.
35 Jennifer Doudna, Embryo Editing Needs Scrutiny, 528 NATURE 6, 6 (2015).
36 Nathan Guo, CRISPR—The Future of Synthetic Biology, LUX CAP. (July 7, 2015),
http://www.luxcapital.com/news/crispr/ [https://perma.cc/7DR9-3WFB].
37 Sarah Zhang, A Biohacker Regrets Publicly Injecting Himself With CRISPR, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/02/biohacking-stunts
-crispr/553511/ [https://perma.cc/KK84-D7MU].
38 See id.
39 See Remah Moustafa Kamel, Assisted Reproductive Technology After the Birth of
Louise Brown, 14 J. REPROD. & INFERTILITY 96, 96 (2013).
40 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-proce
dures/in-vitro-fertilization/home/ovc-20206838 [https://perma.cc/2KA5-9XHN].
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 556.
44 See id.
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affords the parent(s) a choice of which embryo to carry, a choice which enables
discrimination based on traits.45
IVF and PGD are alternatives to CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing in removing
disease.46 But to say they are viable alternatives ignores the practical differences—
namely, price and accessibility. It would be like saying liposuction is a viable alterna-
tive to weight loss pills. Liposuction may have less negative side effects, but the pills
are much cheaper and available at the drug store down the street. IVF medications
cost, on average, between $3,000 and $4,000.47 PGD costs about $3,500,48 far out
of reach for the average family income. It’s not difficult to see why there is so little
demand for such techniques, even where there is a substantial likelihood the embryo
would carry a genetic defect. The practical impact of CRISPR/Cas9’s low cost and
ease of access should not be understated.
Another major difference between these procedures is embryo destruction. IVF
and PGD involve the destruction of each unused embryo, while in CRISPR/Cas9 the
single embryo survives (if desired by the parent).49 Those who believe in a fetal right
to life would presumably never choose IVF and PGD because the unselected embryos
would not survive. But CRISPR/Cas9 does not evoke these same concerns because
it edits only a single, surviving embryo.
C. Concerns with CRISPR/Cas9
Genetic engineering is a moral quagmire. Literature discussing its social, economic,
and legal implications only scratch the surface. CRISPR/Cas9 introduces choice in
an area which was previously randomized. The idea that choice is an essential
precondition to moral action has been part of philosophical debate since the days of
Thomas Aquinas.50 Although abortion and newer reproductive technologies allow
parents to pick and choose potential children, never before has this choice been so
readily accessible. The result is a surplus in bioethical opinions, statements, and
recommendations about the practice.51 The following subsections explore the myriad
45 See id.
46 See id. at 556–58.
47 PGD and IVF Costs, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR OF CHI. (2017), https://www.advanced
fertility.com/pgd-costs.htm [https://perma.cc/RGF7-YWVJ].
48 Id.
49 See Mike Antonucci, Danger Ahead, STANFORD MAG. (Nov/Dec 2015), https://stan
fordmag.org/contents/danger-ahead-14677 [https://perma.cc/SN7N-JKQC].
50 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt.I–II, qq.6–17 (William Benston, pub.,
Encyclopedia Britannica, ed.) (1941) (arguing choice is essential to self-determination).
51 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE
(2017) (discussing the myriad of social and ethical issues surrounding genome editing in gen-
eral). See generally Francis S. Collins, Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-
Editing Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www
.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-funding-research-using
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of safety, social, and ethical issues concerning CRISPR/Cas9 and genome editing
in general.
l. Safety Issues
At this moment, safety is the most pressing concern with CRISPR/Cas9 technol-
ogy. Unresolved safety issues are largely why scientists are so hesitant to begin
clinical trials with human germline modification.52 In 2015, gene-editing technology
originally presented the problem of inaccurate editing and “off-target effects,” or
unwanted genetic changes.53 However, in the aforementioned 2017 CRISPR/Cas9
experiment, the reproduced cells contained one hundred percent of the original,
modified gene with no off-target effects.54 Although the threat of off-target effects
will always be theoretically present, the most recent experiment shows significant
progress in overcoming these safety hurdles.
Using CRISPR/Cas9 to change the human germline presents greater problems,
however. Because the changes pass through multiple generations, there is no way to
tell if unexpected side effects will appear in those subsequent generations.55 This holds
true even if there are no apparent problems in the generation that received the edits.56
Clinical testing would have to span across at least a single generation to quell this
fear: “Unless these effects are studied closely over time and against a diverse back-
drop, the full medical implications of many genetic variants will not be fully under-
stood until they present themselves in fully developed human subjects.”57 Pending
questions of safety prevent CRISPR/Cas9 from clinical testing, and it may take several
years before scientists can smooth them over.
2. Aggravating Social Inequality and Stigma
Another prominent concern is CRISPR/Cas9’s potential to exacerbate social in-
equalities and reinforce stigmas. Of course, any reproductive procedure that affords
-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/67K3-6NPS] (commenting that
bioethicists at the NIH refuse to fund CRISPR/Cas9 given the enormity of safety and ethical
issues and current lack of medical necessity); Eric S. Lander, Brave New Genome, 373 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 5 (2015) (noting the director of the Broad Institute’s comments on both safety
and ethical issues in germline editing from a scientific point of view).
52 See Lander, supra note 51, at 6.
53 Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear
Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363, 364 (2015).
54 See Heidi Ledford, CRISPR Fixes Disease Gene in Viable Human Embryos, NATURE
(Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.nature.com/news/crispr-fixes-disease-gene-in-viable-human-em
bryos-1.22382 [https://perma.cc/Q657-4489] [hereinafter Ledford, CRISPR Fixes].
55 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 568.
56 See Ledford, CRISPR Fixes, supra note 54.
57 Barnett, supra note 18, at 568.
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a choice in genetic outcomes, like IVF and PGD procedures, risks producing these
effects.58 But the affordability and accessibility of CRISPR/Cas9 make these effects
much more foreseeable. One example of how this technology can aggravate social
differences is CRISPR/Cas9’s use in treating sickle cell anemia (SCA).59 SCA dis-
proportionately affects the African American population: about one in thirteen African
American babies are born with the trait.60 Those afflicted with SCA incur enormous
medical costs.61 Because a substantial portion of the African American population
lives below the poverty line,62 CRISPR/Cas9 technology raises fears that other dis-
eases will be removed from the populace while SCA remains just as prevalent.63
Moreover, demarcating the line between disability and disease might reinforce
stigmas about certain disabilities. The obvious example is Down Syndrome. A com-
mon mental disability, Down Syndrome is capable of treatment through genetic
engineering.64 Notwithstanding the potential for shorter life and an increased risk to
contract other illnesses, those with Down Syndrome are disadvantaged only where
society does not provide sufficient accommodation.65 They suffer not from a disease
but how society treats them. Many perceive rare conditions like Down Syndrome,
blindness, or dwarfism as an element of diversity.66 They are unique and conducive
to an eclectic population. CRISPR/Cas9 thus has the potential to aggravate stigmas
against those with such conditions by treating them as an unwanted disease.
3. Eugenics
Humans are no strangers to eugenics. Positive eugenics constitutes “the practice
of encouraging the birth of children to parents having qualities considered desirable
to the community.”67 “Negative” eugenics, on the other hand, refers to limiting or
58 See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 96 (2004) (covering the many ethical issues
associated with ARTs).
59 Data & Statistics on Sickle Cell Disease, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/data.html [https://perma.cc/K55F-W42K].
60 Id.
61 See id. In 2005, the average cost for children with sickle cell disease was $11,702 for
those on Medicaid and $14,772 for workplace-covered insurance. Id.
62 See Suzanne Macartney et al., Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and Hispanic
Groups by State and Place: 2007–2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 2013), https://www2
.census.gov/library/publications/2013/acs/acsbr11-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JQ9-2S7W].
63 See id.
64 See Mentis, supra note 19, at 323.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 323–25; Lauren Oberheim, Selective Hearing: Communication Barriers in
the Court System for Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault, 25 WM.
& MARY J. RACE, GENDER, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 174–78 (2018).
67 Positive Eugenics, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (emphasis added), https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/positive_eugenics [https://perma.cc/8SNE-GDH4].
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removing “defective” traits in the human gene pool.68 Societies accomplish the latter
through sterilization procedures, selecting certain individuals with undesirable traits
and ensuring they cannot breed.69 People have always favored traits that are conducive
to social well-being like being tall, running faster, having a higher IQ, or possessing
keener senses.70 But now CRISPR/Cas9 introduces the element of choice in these
qualities. Individuals can now assert their preference in qualities which were once
randomized.71 The choice, however, inevitably comes at the cost of favoring one trait
over another. Some scholars have suggested such a system could create a “biological
class system” tantamount to the United States’ previous race-based classifications.72
Negative eugenics makes up an ugly chapter in U.S. legal history. In one of its
darkest hours, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell73 upheld a Virginia statute that man-
dated sterilization for individuals with a history of “insanity, imbecility, etc.”74 The
Court’s language reflected society’s entrenched acceptance of this practice, in strong
juxtaposition with our contemporary aversion to it: “It is better for all the world, if in-
stead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind . . . [t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”75 Although the Supreme Court
effectively overturned Buck years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma,76 CRISPR/Cas9’s
flirtation with eugenics brings this debate back into the fold.
The lessons drawn from these cases are useful in analyzing CRISPR/Cas9 as a
vehicle for positive eugenics. First, the Buck v. Bell time period highlights the need
to make careful, ex ante policy considerations.77 The prevailing social and ethical
norms of the 1920s permitted a practice that, in contemporary times, is considered
a gross infraction of an individual’s autonomy.78 The Supreme Court is no stranger
to incorporating policy concerns in their decisions, most notably through the use of
socioeconomic evidence.79 The Court thus cannot succumb to a social and ethical
68 Negative Eugenics, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddiction
aries.com/definition/negative_eugenics [https://perma.cc/Z2SZ-AHTS].
69 See Carolyn Brokowski et al., Cutting Eugenics Out of CRISPR-Cas9, 6 ETHICS BIOL-
OGY ENGINEERING & MED. 263, 270 (2015).
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
74 Id. at 206.
75 Id. at 207 (internal citations omitted).
76 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court held the legislation permitting sterilization ran afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 541. Although this left room for states to create con-
stitutional sterilization laws that applied equally, states never created such laws. Widespread
coverage of Nazi sterilization procedures the year before created sufficient unease with the
procedure, a discomfort that is arguably just as prevalent today. 
77 See Buck, 274 U.S. at 200.
78 See id.
79 The most obvious example is how the Court used socioeconomic evidence to overturn
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climate that favors private use of CRISPR/Cas9 without considering its potential for
eugenics. For the Court—without considering the evolving nature of such norms—
might realize its mistake after it is too late. After all, the Nazi’s eugenics program
began with a campaign to first eliminate genetic disease from the populace.80 Second,
like with the inequality concerns, the threat of eugenics strengthens the state or
federal government’s interest in banning human germline editing.81 Fear of sliding
into eugenics would supply the state with a convincing argument for prohibition.
II. CRISPR/CAS9 AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
The Constitution provides each individual with a strong privacy interest against
government interference.82 Does this right encompass CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing?
Proponents of genetic engineering often invoke the right to privacy to defend the
practice.83 They argue governmental restriction of the procedure—after the safety
issues have been sufficiently resolved—unconstitutionally intrudes on the individ-
ual’s procreative liberty.84 CRISPR/Cas9’s controversial nature would not deter the
Court from recognizing a fundamental right in its use. The Court decided the right
to privacy included abortion, after all, when the nation was vehemently divided over
a woman’s right to the procedure.85 Furthermore, no precedent in the Supreme Court’s
history applies seamlessly to germline editing. Using CRISPR/Cas9 modification
is a novel fact scenario with which the Court will eventually have to grapple.
This Part analyzes whether the individual is entitled to use CRISPR/Cas9 pro-
cedures as a fundamental privacy right. The first section will outline an individual’s
right to privacy in general. As that section indicates, the unique contours of genetic
engineering requires the Court to analyze the issue through either a minor’s right to
bodily integrity or procreative liberty. The next section points out how CRISPR/Cas9
can determine how burdensome a future child will be. It will analyze whether this
determination is important in establishing a fundamental right, as it is in the abortion
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
494–95, 494 n.11 (1954).
80 ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 63 (W. H. Freeman and Company ed., 1999).
81 See Thomas S. Patterson, Note, The Outer Limits of Human Genetic Engineering: A
Constitutional Examination of Parents’ Procreative Liberty to Genetically Enhance Their
Offspring, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 913, 931 (1999).
82 Id. at 927–28.
83 See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 163–64 (1994) (defending positive genetic engineering on procreative
liberty grounds); Attanasio, supra note 6, at 1288 (concluding genetic engineering could be
justified on right to privacy grounds at the expense of equality concerns).
84 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 163–64.
85 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade and Its Impact, U.S. HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/us/57d
.asp [https://perma.cc/C62Y-LF4W].
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context. The next section asks why a parent can select traits indirectly through abor-
tion but not through less costly gene editing. The final section will explore how the
right to privacy framework deals with a minors’ right to bodily integrity. The Supreme
Court traditionally protects minor’s decisions against their parents’ interests if the
minors are mature enough to make the decision.86 However, the Court does not hold
this right against parents when they treat the child before that mature age, and for
that reason, the minor does not have prenatal autonomy interests.87
A. The General Right to Privacy
Griswold v. Connecticut88 was the first case to consider the constitutional right
to privacy regarding family planning choices.89 A Connecticut statute prohibited the
sale of contraceptives, even to married couples.90 The Supreme Court struck down
the law,91 holding a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu-
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”92 The
Court further protected an individual’s autonomy interest from unwarranted govern-
mental interference in Eisenstadt v. Baird.93 There, the statute prohibited the sale of
contraceptives to just unmarried couples.94 Striking down the law, the Court pro-
tected the “right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child.”95 The Court’s language foreshadowed the
use of the right to privacy in the abortion debate.
One of the most controversial uses of the right to privacy came in the form of
Roe v. Wade.96 Establishing the right to obtain an abortion as a fundamental privacy
right, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law prohibiting the procedure.97 Interest-
ingly, it afforded no rights or even constitutional standing to the fetus, instead framing
the issue as the woman’s right to procreate against the state’s interest in potential
life.98 Given the chance to overturn Roe in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
86 See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439–42 (1983);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979).
87 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44.
88 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89 Id. at 485–86.
90 Id. at 480.
91 Id. at 486.
92 Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
93 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
94 Id. at 441.
95 Id. at 453.
96 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97 Id. at 164.
98 Id. at 162–64.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey99 two decades later, the Court instead reinforced the central
holding of Roe: “[M]atters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”100 After Roe and Casey it
was clear the Court created an independent framework for evaluating these cases.101
To show, abortion jurisprudence later adopted a host of legal rules and jargon of its
own.102 The right to privacy, however, has always remained the bedrock.103
Despite the broad protections of intimate decisions, the Court has not answered
whether there is a privacy right in gene editing. We should avoid finding such a
right based solely on the sweeping language that upholds the right in some of these
foundational privacy cases. Genetic engineering through CRISPR/Cas9, after all,
only borrows select elements from abortion jurisprudence. Unlike in Roe or Casey,
the decision does not turn on whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. But like in
those cases, the parent’s decision is informed by what burdens come with child-
rearing. Germline manipulation falls somewhere in the gray area between the unique
abortion framework and procreative rights in general, and for this reason we must
analyze it through more specific lenses within the right to privacy doctrine.
B. Child-Rearing as a Burden
It is an unfortunate fact that children with genetic diseases require more atten-
tion, care, and money.104 The medical costs for children with Down Syndrome, for
example, are twelve to thirteen times higher than the costs of those children without
the disorder.105 The hospitalization costs for those with birth defects is over $2.6
billion each year106—and this cost does not include the emotional or foregone
opportunity costs.107 Based on the available statistics, without devaluing those with
the condition already, we can conclude children with genetic defects carry additional
burdens for the parents.
99 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
100 Id. at 851.
101 See id. at 878–79; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–66.
102 For example, the Court has fumbled to find the appropriate fulcrum between a woman’s
right from government interference and the state’s interest in protecting fetal life. The Court’s
first attempt was the trimester framework in Roe, in which the privacy right did not protect abor-
tions after the first trimester. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. The Court later abandoned this approach
in Casey, now extending the right to abort as far as fetal viability. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
103 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
104 Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Birth Defects Are Costly, MAHONING CTY BD
HEALTH (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.mahoninghealth.org/health.org/health/birth-defects-are
-costly-cdc-features [https://perma.cc/3728-C28K].
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id.
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The burden associated with pregnancy and child-rearing is of central importance
in abortion cases. The Roe opinion pointed out how unwanted child-rearing “may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future.”108 Although it is not clear whether
it was referring to the mother or the child’s health (or both), the opinion also noted
“[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved.”109 If the Court was referring to the child, it suggests the child’s prenatal
condition is a factor in determining the burdens of motherhood. Regardless, the bur-
den of child-rearing is essential in elevating a woman’s procreative choice to that
of a fundamental right.110 John Robertson, a proponent of unfettered procreative
liberty, points out that “[b]ecause expected outcome is so material to reproductive
decision making, it implicates the liberty interest both in avoiding and in achieving
reproduction.”111 The fundamental right, as the Court formulated, is the right to termi-
nate the pregnancy.112 But does this entail the idea that the woman should also be free
to control how much of a burden the pregnancy will be? In other words, can the woman
adjust the burden through gene editing technology by removing genetic disease?
Reproductive technologies that uncover genetic defects, including CRISPR/Cas9,
reveal how burdensome a future child will be. They can influence a prospective parent’s
choice of whether the embryo is worth the burden and, consequently, whether to
continue the pregnancy. Given the Court’s robust protection of this choice, it makes
sense that the parent should be able to control the extent of her burden. Why should
a parent be able to remove the burden altogether, via an abortion, but not be able to
lessen that burden through CRISPR/Cas9 editing?
We can resolve the issue by juxtaposing pre-birth burdens with post-birth
burdens. The former are inseparable from the pregnancy process and include the
physical tolls of pregnancy, increased travel and clothing costs, social stigma for un-
married women, the opportunity costs, etc.113 The pain of childbirth needs no
iteration here. The woman must bear these hardships whether the child has random-
ized or preselected genes. Post-birth burdens, on the other hand, only involve the
costs of child-rearing after birth, including the accompanying medical costs, diapers,
108 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
109 Id.
110 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (reaffirming Roe’s con-
clusion that the burdens of child-rearing are inseparable from the termination decision, as the
mother is “subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. . . . Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision
of the woman’s role. . . .”). This section of the opinion also suggests pregnancy imposes unfair
burdens on women specifically. See id.; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 152 (“[P]ersons
have a right not to procreate because of the physical, psychological, and social burdens that
reproduction entails, with the person directly affected the best judge of when reproduction
is too burdensome.”).
111 ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 152.
112 See id.
113 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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food, education, etc.114 Genetic modification only affects the burdens of the already-
born child.115 Although the Court does not explicitly distinguish the burdens in this
manner, the language from Roe and Casey reveals it is really only concerned with
the postnatal burdens.116 Moreover, the Court protects the right to terminate a
pregnancy when the mother intends others to raise the child through adoption.117 The
mother avoids the post-birth burdens in that scenario. Even though the Court used
broad language to describe the “burdensome” factor in abortion decisions,118 and that
factor is secondary to the right from governmental interference,119 the clear implica-
tion is that the Court considers only those burdens inherent in carrying a fetus to term.
Thus, the “burden” argument fails to establish a fundamental child-rearing right in
CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing.
C. Abortion, ARTs, and Negative Eugenics
Abortion creates the ability to discriminate based on genetic disposition. A
woman may choose to terminate a pregnancy upon discovery of the fetus’s genetic
abnormalities.120 If this is ever the case, it is usually because the child carries a de-
bilitating disorder.121 Other artificial reproductive technologies like IVF and PGD
also provide prospective parents this option.122 Because it rejects certain traits, this
process is a form of negative eugenics.123 The practical function of PGD is to single
out favorable genes, usually in situations where there is a high risk the offspring will
carry a genetic disease.124 Although an individual’s procreative right to an IVF pro-
cedure has never come before the Supreme Court, there is good reason to believe the
114 What It Costs to Have and Raise a Baby, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/baby
/what-it-costs-to-have-and-raise-a-baby.
115 Of course, fetuses with genetic diseases or disorders might incur more costs pre-birth
than a fetus without a disease or disorder. But for purposes of the argument these costs are
negligible compared to the additional post-birth costs.
116 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
117 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (discussing how informed consent statutes may include
information on adoptions).
118 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (noting how maternity can lead to a “distressful life and future,”
unwanted child care, and psychological harm in general).
119 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
120 See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 141, 142 (2005) (noting that parents have sued under the tort of
wrongful birth alleging they would have aborted the child had the impairment been disclosed).
121 See id. (explaining birth defects, like Tay-Sachs disease, can be detected in genetic
testing).
122 For explanations on how these technologies work, see Section I.B.
123 Daniel J. Kerles, From Eugenics to Patents: Genetics, Law, and Human Rights, 75
ANN. HUM. GENETICS 326, 327 (2011).
124 See PGD and IVF Costs, supra note 47.
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Court would protect it as a fundamental right. In 2002, for example, the Court of
Human Rights in Costa Rica ruled a prohibition on IVF violated the individual’s right
to privacy, personal integrity, and family formation.125 These reproductive proce-
dures, after all, turn on the decision to bear children, the essential component in the
fundamental right.126
So if there is a fundamental right to eliminate potential life altogether based on its
traits, is there a fundamental right to change those traits? Why should woman have
to go through these expensive artificial reproductive technologies or an abortion to
achieve the same outcome? John Robertson argues the right to avoid procreation
after knowing the child’s genetic disposition entails the right to select those traits.127
However, the procreative right only incidentally affords the choice to discrimi-
nate based on genetics. The decision of whether or not to bear children necessarily
creates a form of negative eugenics. Just because the Court protects reproductive de-
cisions does not mean it protects potential side effects of those decisions. In one of
its broadest conceptions of the right, the Court ruled that the individual is “free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”128 The Court never mentioned—let
alone cautioned against—negative eugenics as an unintended consequence of abortion.
This should come as no surprise. Given the cost, physical and emotional strain, and
societal stigma associated with abortion, prospective parents have little incentive to
select traits via abortion.129 If anything, they would probably undergo an abortion
only for the most debilitating conditions like sickle cell anemia or Huntington’s
disease. The same is true for IVF and PGD. It is hardly imaginable a parent would
choose these procedures unless there was already a substantial risk the embryo would
carry a genetic disease. The price tags for tall or blue-eyed genes hardly seems worth
the $3,500,130 especially considering there are no guarantees.131 But that is what makes
CRISPR/Cas9 modification so unique and so practical. CRISPR/Cas9 strips away
the trait choosing component of abortions, and it does so at an incredibly low cost.132
The money, time, and emotional toll exhausted in choosing traits through PGD, IVF,
125 Lynn M. Morgan, IVF Ban Lifted in Costa Rica: A Success for Reproductive Rights?,
PLOS BLOGS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://blogs.plos.org/globalhealth/2016/03/ivf-ban-lifted-in
-costa-rica-a-success-for-reproductive-rights [https://perma.cc/PTZ4-25L7]. See also Nicole
L. Cucci, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures, 72 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 417, 423–31 (1998) (discussing how IVF is constitutionally protected under the right
to privacy doctrine).
126 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (reaffirming that Roe pro-
tects the right to decide whether to bear a child or not).
127 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 152.
128 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
129 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
130 PGD and IVF Costs, supra note 47.
131 See id. (discussing success rates).
132 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 565.
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and abortion are stripped away.133 But, within its abortion jurisprudence, this par-
ticular feature of reproductive decision-making is not what the Court protects. The
Court would have to fine-tune the existing privacy right to conform to CRISPR/Cas9
germline editing or create a new fundamental right altogether.
D. A Minor’s Right to Bodily Autonomy
CRISPR/Cas9 does not involve editing the germline of oneself. The process
involves modifying a human embryo, which itself carries no legal status. But be-
cause the changes affect another future individual, some legal scholars raise the issue
of whether germline editing violates the embryo’s autonomy rights as a minor.134
Germline edits, as opposed to somatic cell treatments, are permanent changes not
only for the affected minor but for the minor’s future children (and for many subse-
quent generations).135 These changes have a more obdurate impact than the choice
of education, for example, because the minor can renounce those teachings once she
is a legal adult. So which constitutional rights and liberties protect the minor against
his parents’ decision to genetically modify him?
The Supreme Court frequently upholds a minor’s right to bodily integrity through
the right to privacy doctrine.136 In fact, the Court treats minors’ decisions regarding
abortion differently than choosing other medical treatments for themselves.137
Treating minors for illnesses is generally uncontroversial, and this probably ac-
counts for the difference. Consent to medical procedures mostly exists in the realm
of state statutes and common law.138 Medical treatment of minors only touches the
brim of constitutional law in rare, specific circumstances.139 Even most of those cases
invoke the right to refuse medical treatment, like when parents preclude treatment
for religious reasons.140
133 Id. at 562–65.
134 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 162 (commenting how genetic engineering may
violate the autonomy rights of the minor); see also Patterson, supra note 81, at 931 (arguing
the Court has not established sufficient fetal rights to make the determination of whether they
have independent liberty interests).
135 Barnett, supra note 18, at 556.
136 B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making By And On Behalf of Adolescents: Recon-
sidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 48 (2012) [hereinafter Hill,
Medical Decision Making] (explaining the Court’s outlining of minors’ constitutional privacy
rights through a series of cases involving parental consent or notice before abortions).
137 Id. at 43.
138 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978) (finding the state can-
not overturn parental refusal of minor’s treatment where the child’s life was not in danger);
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970) (holding a
minor’s consent is contingent on his or her understanding of the risks and benefits involved).
139 See Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1062; Younts, 469 P.2d at 337.
140 See Andrea Molinelli et al., Legal Guardians and Refusal of Blood Transfusion, 7
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At first glance, one might deduce minors have a robust right to privacy in medical
treatment decisions. A lengthy line of Supreme Court cases protect the minor’s right
to bodily integrity against statutes that demand parental consent.141 However, these
cases almost exclusively involve decisions regarding contraceptives or abortions, i.e.,
reproductive capacity.142 As in defining an individual’s right to make medical deci-
sions,143 the Court’s reasoning differs in regard to this category of decision-making.
Only several years after deciding Roe, the Court confronted a minor’s right to
an abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.144 Among other
provisions, a Missouri statute required a minor present written consent from a parent
in order to undergo an abortion.145 The Court ultimately struck down the statute,
upholding the minor’s constitutional right to privacy against the wishes of the parent.146
Justice Blackmun ruled, “[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”147 The
Court demanded a compelling state interest to justify this parental veto power, and
it ultimately found none.148 Interestingly, the Court emphasized that minors possess
constitutional rights, even if the state has broader authority to regulate children’s
activities more than adults.149
Where Danforth avoided the minor age analysis, Bellotti v. Baird150 confronted
it head-on. Bellotti also involved a state statute requiring parental consent before the
minor could obtain an abortion.151 However, the Court ruled the statute was uncon-
stitutional on distinct grounds.152 The statute did not provide an exception where the
minor was sufficiently mature and well-informed to make the decision on her own
behalf.153 In other words, whether a minor’s right to privacy trumps the interests of
the parents (and, consequently, the state) depends in part on the minor’s decision-
making capacity.154 The state must afford the minor an opportunity to prove, before
NCIB 319, 319–22 (2009) (discussing several statutes and cases related to Jehovah’s Witnesses
refusing blood transfusion for their children).
141 See Hill, Medical Decision Making, supra note 136, at 48.
142 See infra text accompanying notes 144–55.
143 See infra Part III.
144 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
145 Id. at 58.
146 Id. at 74.
147 Id. at 75.
148 Id.
149 See id. Justice Blackmun, in making this claim, cites a number of cases that held juve-
niles retain constitutional rights, even if they are not absolute.
150 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
151 Id. at 625.
152 Id. at 650.
153 Id. at 647–48.
154 See Hill, Medical Decision Making, supra note 136, at 66–67.
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a judicial body, her competence in making this decision as a “bypass” of the parental
consent requirement.155
These cases make clear two points: (1) The minor’s competence to make pro-
creative decisions is an integral factor in delegating this decision-making authority,
and (2) even where this competence is accepted, the courts or the parents may still
be able to override this decision if either believes the procedure is not in the minor’s
best interest.156 This framework was further explained by B. Jessie Hill in her article
on the subject:
If . . . minors’ bodily integrity rights extend beyond the abortion
context, and if the mature-minor doctrine is not just an exception
to but rather fundamentally inconsistent with a presumption of
parental decision-making authority, it must be true that, to the
extent minors possess a constitutional right to bodily integrity,
that right overrides the common-law default rule of parental
decision making for adolescents.157
Here the Court upholds a minor’s right to make autonomous health choices, and it
has done so only where the minor is of sufficient age and maturity to make those
determinations.158 This is known as the mature-minor doctrine.159 The primary issue
in these cases often boils down to whether the parents or the minor has the best
decision-making capacity.160 The Court strikes down state statutes that require parental
consent for medical treatment where (1) the minor has achieved an appropriate age
to make the decision, and (2) the state has no other compelling interest, particularly
in safety.161 The strength of the mature-minor doctrine is indicated in several other
cases. In its most extreme application, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a seventeen-
year-old’s decision to refuse treatment for leukemia.162 The Court, however, weighed
this right against legitimate state interests, including the “preservation of life,”
“protecting the interests of third parties,” “prevention of suicide,” and “maintaining
the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”163 Although this case involved the
refusal of medical treatment, it highlights how courts rigorously uphold the mature-
minor doctrine in both state and federal cases.164
155 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
156 Hill, Medical Decision Making, supra note 136, at 62.
157 Id. (internal citations omitted).
158 See id. at 42.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 40, 46, 57.
161 Id. at 62–72.
162 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326–28 (Ill. 1989).
163 Id. at 328 (internal citations omitted).
164 See id.
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So how does this constitutional framework play out in CRISPR/Cas9 germline
modification? The first issue is the mature-minor doctrine. One might argue the minor’s
consent is overridden by the time he is mature enough to make a decision regarding
his genetic disposition. By that reasoning, the minor’s autonomy interest is always
impeded by germline editing. However, the minor can never consent to his genetic
makeup at the sufficiently mature age. This must necessarily be the case, as germline
editing is infeasible once the minor reaches that age.165 As far as the mature-minor
doctrine is involved, choosing to remove genetic disease from the embryo is indis-
tinguishable from choosing the child’s kindergarten school. In both scenarios, the
offspring is not at the appropriate age to make the informed decision for himself, a
necessary precondition to the mature-minor doctrine.166 In addition, once he is suf-
ficiently mature, the minor has the option of selecting somatic cell therapy to change
a genetic condition (most of the time).167 This choice mirrors traditional areas re-
served for parental discretion, like education, nutrition, and upbringing location.168
The minor can reject or accept any of these after emancipation.169 Moreover, although
the effects are permanent, the Court treats this fact as merely incidental to the broader
privacy concerns.170
Even if treated as a purely medical procedure, CRISPR/Cas9 editing does not
violate any of the minor’s decision-making autonomy. Genetic manipulation—
almost by definition—imparts greater and more enduring effects on the minor than
most other parental choices on her behalf.171 Because the minor never receives the
opportunity to consent for such invasive treatment, one could conclude a CRISPR/Cas9
modification of the minor’s DNA necessarily intrudes his decision-making auton-
omy. That argument overlooks the Supreme Court’s narrow construct of the privacy
right as applied to minors. From the framework in Danforth and Bellotti, the Court
treats the opportunity to make a medical decision as necessary to invoke this right.172
The Constitution does not protect those decisions made before the sufficiently mature
165 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 555.
166 Cf. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327–38.
167 Although not conducive to treat every prenatal condition, somatic cell therapy has been
effective in treating rarer diseases like severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) and some
professionals believe it will one day be used to treat HIV. There are numerous examples of dis-
eases which both somatic and germline editing can treat. See, e.g., Fulvio Mavilio & Giuliana
Ferrari, Genetic Modification of Somatic Stem Cells, 9 EMBO REP. 564, 564–69 (2008),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3327547/ [https://perma.cc/ENU3-PZTJ].
168 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 164.
169 See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 342 (2008).
170 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 164.
171 See id. (“[G]enetic enhancement might have a far greater effect on offspring than
postbirth efforts.”).
172 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979); cf. Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
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age173—if it did, all invasive medical treatments before maturity would be placed
under strict scrutiny.174 CRISPR/Cas9 modification, as discussed above, resembles
a medical treatment with permanent effects rather than a procreative option.175 Conse-
quently, the discussion of protecting minors’ bodily autonomy should mirror a situation
where a parent consents for the child to undergo an invasive—but therapeutic—
operation before the appropriate age of consent. Although there is little case law on
this point,176 therapeutic procedures for minors do not directly implicate a child’s
autonomy interests as much as, for instance, choosing an abortion or buying contra-
ceptives.177 There is no well-defined autonomy right for such procedures before the
age of maturity.178
The legal concepts of fetal harm and wrongful life also shed light on a minor’s
autonomy. Although the modification took place while the individual was an embryo,
could a genetically modified minor claim she was harmed from CRISPR/Cas9 germ-
line editing? In Roe, the Supreme Court declared that “the word ‘person’ as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”179 However, numerous
states provide a cause of action for post-birth defects where the cause of the injury hap-
pened while the individual was in utero.180 One of the most prominent examples comes
from Smith v. Brennan.181 There, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a negligent
driver was liable for causing a child’s post-birth deformities.182 It held the child was
entitled to redress regardless of his personhood status at the time of the injury’s
cause.183 In addition, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia afford mothers
173 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
174 As Bellotti afforded “mature” minors the opportunity to exercise a fundamental right
in abortion and thus invokes strict scrutiny over a burdensome law, the Court would presumably
apply the same standard of review to a medical procedure with similar permanent and life-
long consequences. See id. at 643.
175 See generally Barnett, supra note 18 (discussing how CRISPR permanently removes
genes).
176 See ROBERTSON, supra note 83, at 167. Reflecting the uncontroversial nature of pre-
natal medication for even nontherapeutic purposes, Robertson argued “[a]s long as [prenatal
medications] are safe, effective, and likely to benefit offspring, they would no more impermis-
sibly objectify or commodify offspring than postnatal enhancement efforts do.” Id.
177 See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648.
178 See Hill, Medical Decision Making, supra note 136, at 39–49.
179 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
180 State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes Against Pregnant
Women, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal
-homicide-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7UHN-84A2] [hereinafter State Laws on Fetal
Homicide]. At least thirty-eight states have enacted fetal homicide laws, and twenty-three of
those states extend such laws to the earliest stages of pregnancy. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1841
(2012) (making it a federal crime to cause death or serious bodily injury to a child who was
in utero at the time of the offense).
181 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
182 Id. at 505.
183 Id. at 504.
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a cause of action for the birth of a healthy child where the mother does not want to
give birth.184 These latter cases are known as “wrongful birth” cases.185 Although state
courts frequently rule against plaintiffs in these cases, they have achieved some degree
of success.186
It is not difficult to foresee a child born with CRISPR/Cas9 germline modifica-
tions bringing an action against his parent, especially if the procedure inadvertently
causes harm. The parent can also bring a claim for “wrongful life” if the treating
physician was negligent in editing the embryo. However, these precedents have mini-
mal significance to the minor’s constitutional rights against the parent or state. Unlike
a minor’s right to privacy, the minors’ autonomy here is protected solely through
state tort law. The Seventh Circuit recently dismissed a fetal harm case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.187 Consequently, as this Note will discuss further in Part
III, the state legislatures and courts are the best arbitrators for these kinds of claims.
Localized populations can more efficiently assert their values over fetal harm and
wrongful life causes of action. The decentralized system is especially advantageous
for the issue because state populations vehemently differ on the fetus’s right to life.188
Although the Court may consider these state cases in determining the minor’s au-
tonomy interests, they are not dispositive to its ultimate decision.
III. CRISPR/CAS9 AND MEDICAL AUTONOMY
Genetic modification is invariably a medical procedure. Even if the Supreme
Court refuses to recognize CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing as an exercise of one’s
right to privacy, it may recognize the practice as an exercise of medical autonomy.
A ban on private treatment, after all, stands in stark contrast to the American laissez-
faire tradition.189 The virtue of unencumbered medical access stretches back to 1914
when Justice Cardozo emphasized that, “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. . . .”190
Once the procedure is proven safe, which (if any) constitutional safeguards
protect the individual from unwanted government interference? Do these safeguards
take the form of a fundamental right or a lesser liberty interest? The Court has a rich
history of individuals claiming a right to access medical treatment.191
184 Hensel, supra note 120, at 153.
185 Id. at 143.
186 See id. at 161 n.117 (noting that only three jurisdictions—California, New Jersey, and
Washington—now recognize these kinds of actions).
187 See In re Straw, 720 F.App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2017).
188 See State Laws on Fetal Homicide, supra note 180, at 180.
189 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated
by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
190 Id.
191 See generally B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
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One of the most compelling arguments for medical autonomy came from England
v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.192 In this “mostly forgotten case,”193
the Fifth Circuit ruled the state medical board could not deny licensing to chiroprac-
tors.194 Although the source of the individual protection is unclear, the language
points to a substantive due process right: “[T]he state cannot deny to any individual
the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method of treatment of his ills . . . .”195
It is worth noting that this case arrived long after the “Lochner era,” where the Su-
preme Court expanded individual rights through the substantive due process mecha-
nism.196 Within the next decade, however, individual protections took the form of
right to privacy, and substantive due process rights lost their former prestige.197
However, public interest often trumps this medical autonomy, and this is the
case with CRISPR/Cas9 technology. B. Jessie Hill explores at length how the Court
treats such claims in her article The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines.198 This Part will analyze the strength of what Hill
coined the “right to make medical treatment choices”199 as applied to CRISPR/Cas9
procedures. First, the “maternal health” exception in abortion cases reveals the Court’s
strong deference to an individual’s health over state interest.200 This section dis-
cusses how the Court’s reasoning in the “partial-birth” abortion cases reinforces
autonomous medical decisions. The next section, however, analyzes cases where the
Court deferred to the legislature in regulating medical treatments. These cases lend
to the conclusion that public health concerns trump autonomy interests, even when
the legislation does not support the fact-finding.201 The final section discusses why
this “deference” approach (conveniently) avoids the issue of whether there is a right
to create disabilities in embryos. Ultimately, while the Court might recognize some
lesser liberty interest in accessing CRISPR/Cas9 for germline changes, it would defer
to the government’s fact-finding and compelling interest in protecting public welfare.
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007) [hereinafter Hill, The Consti-
tutional Right] (discussing how the Court treated individual claims to access medical treatments
against government regulations).
192 259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958).
193 Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 279.
194 England, 259 F.2d at 627.
195 Id.
196 See Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 1, 7 (2004).
197 Id. at 11.
198 See Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 294–304.
199 Id. at 291.
200 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973); see also Eugene Volokh, Medical
Self-Defense Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment of Organs, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1827 (2007).
201 See infra notes 210–26 and accompanying text.
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A. Medical Self-Defense
The maternal health exception is a bastion for medical autonomy. Replete in
abortion jurisprudence, the exception requires the state to permit abortions when the
mother’s life or health is at stake.202 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court traced the
maternal health requirement back to Roman laws on abortion and detailed its roots
in U.S. history and tradition.203 The Court reaffirmed the need for the exception in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noting a law restricting post-viable abortions is justified
so long as it “contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life
or health.”204 Eugene Volokh argued this line of cases actually protects two separate
but interrelated rights: (1) the right to an abortion, and (2) the right to “defend oneself
using medical care.”205 Indeed, this medical “necessity” component of abortion is
generally uncontroversial.206 As of 2007, only ten to fifteen percent of Americans
believed abortion should be banned regardless of this exception.207 However, while
the exception protected the mother’s “life or health”208 in explicit terms, there is a
noteworthy rift between “life” and “health.”209 The Court explored this rift in the partial-
birth abortion cases.
The partial-birth abortion cases are unique because they do not directly implicate
procreative rights. In both cases, Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I)210 and Gonzalez
v. Carhart (Carhart II),211 the issue did not involve the decision to bear children.212
The plaintiff mothers in each case had already decided to undergo an abortion—the
Court’s review focused on the kind of abortion.213 The issue, then, revolves around the
safety of the procedures and a lack of a medical necessity exception. These cases thus
202 See Volokh, supra note 200, at 1824–29 (defining and discussing the general history
of the medical health exception in abortion cases).
203 410 U.S. at 130. Later in the opinion, Justice Blackmun traces this exception to early
English common law and most state statutes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See
id. at 137–41.
204 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
205 See Volokh, supra note 200, at 1824.
206 See id. at 1824–25.
207 Id. at 1825.
208 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (holding the law must contain exceptions “for pregnancies which
endanger the woman’s life or health”) (emphasis added); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164
(1973) (holding the state may restrict abortion except where it is “necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother”) (emphasis added).
209 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
210 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
211 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
212 See Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 291–92.
213 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 132–34; Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 921–23; see also Hill, The
Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 291 (“[I]t is important to recognize that Carhart I (like
Carhart II, the second ‘partial-birth’ abortion case) is not about the right to choose abortion
in the usual sense.”).
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offer an enlightening analysis into how the Court treats issues about autonomous treat-
ment decisions. More importantly, the safety issues in these cases mirror the dynamic
between CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing and alternative methods for trait selection.
These cases involve two means of abortion: (1) “dilation and extraction,” or
“D&X,”214 and (2) “dilation and evacuation,” or “D&E.”215 In Carhart I, a Nebraska
statute prohibited D&X procedures (partial birth abortions) because the procedure
usually entailed the fetus tearing apart.216 The statute did not include an exception that
permitted the procedure where the mother’s life or health was at stake.217 Nebraska
pointed out there was no need for an exception because alternative, safer procedures
were already readily available.218 Because both procedures did not threaten the mother’s
life, the question turned on whether a strict “health,” i.e., not “life,” exception was
necessary.219 The Court struck down the Nebraska statute in part because it lacked
this exception.220 Where the law restricts a “particular abortion procedure [that] could
endanger women’s health,”221 that law unduly infringes on the woman’s constitu-
tional rights.222 Justice O’Connor stressed the need for the exception in her dissent
and pointed out that this requirement was stronger for previable fetuses.223 At this
point, we can envision a robust individual interest in medical self-defense.
In Carhart II, however, the Court reached the opposite outcome. This time the
Court considered a federal ban on D&X procedures.224 Having already determined
that the statute was sufficiently tailored, the Court contemplated the lack of a medi-
cal necessity exception.225 Here, the Court ruled the exception was unnecessary
because unresolved safety questions were best left for legislative determination:
Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks,
are within the legislative competence when the regulation is ratio-
nal and in pursuit of legitimate ends. When standard medical
options are available, mere convenience does not suffice to
displace them; and if some procedures have different risks than
214 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 136. The procedure is also known as “intact D&E” because it ex-
tracts the fetus while it is whole and can still feel pain. Id. at 136–37.
215 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 924.
216 See id. at 921–22.
217 Id. at 930.
218 Id. at 931.
219 See id. at 938.
220 Id. at 937–38.
221 Id. at 938 (emphasis added).
222 Id.
223 See id. at 947–48 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
224 Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II ), 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (considering the validity
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)).
225 Id. at 161–67.
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others, it does not follow that the State is altogether barred from
imposing reasonable regulations.226
Interestingly, the Court did not even begin to consider the safety arguments from
either party.227 It instead deferred fact-finding to the legislature and ruled an “as-
applied” challenge is necessary to resolve any factual disputes of safety.228 Thus, while
recognizing the need to preserve maternal health in Carhart I, the Court ultimately
found it was not best-suited to identify “significant health risks.”229 Although Carhart
II stressed the need for an as-applied challenge, the ruling did not completely under-
mine the maternal health exception.230 B. Jessie Hill argued the additional procedure
would still consider the plaintiff’s medical arguments and that “medical issues could
still be considered in the context of preenforcement as-applied challenges.”231
The medical self-defense doctrine does not protect CRISPR/Cas9 germline
editing as a safer or more feasible alternative of trait selection. The Court would not
grant the same level of protection even if it includes defense of future offspring as
tantamount to self-defense. First, the “life” of the fetus is not at stake in genetic en-
gineering, even for therapeutic treatment.232 The prospective parent would have to
claim she is entitled to CRISPR/Cas9 because it benefits her or the embryo’s health.
Although the plaintiff was able to choose between procedures based on medical
consequences in Carhart I, the same is not true in the more recent case, Carhart II.233
The parent wishing to germline edit would have to show that the technique is safer in
an as-applied challenge. Even then, there is no substantial evidence that CRISPR/Cas9
is inherently safer than the alternatives.234 Although CRISPR/Cas9 is far more ac-
curate and affordable, it is not safer than IVF or PGD, both of which involve the
same embryo-extraction process.235 As the Court mentioned, “mere convenience
226 Id. at 166.
227 See id. at 161–68.
228 Id. at 167–68. Reversing this particular issue from Carhart I, the Court opined:
Stenberg has been interpreted to leave no margin of error for legislatures
to act in the face of medical uncertainty. . . . A zero tolerance policy
would strike down legitimate abortion regulations . . . if some part of the
medical community were disinclined to follow the proscription. This
is too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power . . . .
Id. at 166 (internal citations omitted).
229 Id. at 129 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328
(2006)).
230 See Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 323.
231 Id.
232 Many debilitating genetic disorders shorten life, but none immediately threaten the fetus’s
health in utero.
233 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 127; Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 915 (2000).
234 See Belluck, supra note 1; Ledford, Where in the World, supra note 7.
235 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 51, at 65; Ellison, supra note 6, at 618; Polcz &
Lewis, supra note 22.
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does not suffice to displace”236 alternative means—in this case, IVF or PGD. Moreover,
in Carhart II the Court weighed the availability of a health exception against the state’s
interest in protecting prenatal life.237 The state already has a substantial interest in pre-
venting the possible, negative consequences of germline editing.238 This interest would
trump any “life or health” claims a potential parent would make for her offspring.
If Carhart I were the standalone decision on partial birth abortions, the case for
a right to medical improvement using CRISPR/Cas9 would prove much more robust.
By requiring a medical self-defense exception, the Court safeguarded the individual’s
medical autonomy. However, Carhart II—by refusing to rule over factual disputes
of safety—ultimately undermined that autonomy interest. As a result, the individual
cannot claim a right to CRISPR/Cas9 through the same reasoning that upheld a
maternal health exception.
B. The ‘Public Health’ Ceiling
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether an individual has a
fundamental right to private medical treatment. In a recent case involving this issue,
the D.C. Court of Appeals expressed in unequivocal language: “We do not address
the broader question of whether access to medicine might ever implicate fundamen-
tal rights.”239 Furnished with over a century of state and federal cases proposing the
question, the Court has yet to answer with clarity. Instead, the Court dodged the
issue—resigning it to the outskirts of constitutional law—while addressing narrower
questions.240
However, the Supreme Court has been much more vocal about the state’s power
to regulate medicine in the name of public health.241 The right to privacy’s focus on the
individual is overshadowed by the state interest in population health.242 A line of cases
stretching back to the early twentieth century repeatedly and adamantly assert this state
power, especially in the face of untested or fringe medical treatments. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts243 in particular was paramount in establishing this state power. This
236 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 166.
237 See Volokh, supra note 200, at 1829–30 (arguing that while there may be a right to
medical self-defense, the State’s interest in regulating the treatment may be greater).
238 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 157 (describing how there is an interest in protecting the
ethics of the medical profession).
239 Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
240 See id. at 711–12.
241 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001); United
States v. Rutherford, 422 U.S. 544 (1979); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
242 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38 (wanting to avoid “the welfare and safety of an entire pop-
ulation being subordinated to the notions of a single individual . . . .”) (emphasis added); Hill,
The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 295.
243 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding the state’s interest in public health supports mandatory
vaccination laws).
2019] A CLEANER, CRISPR CONSTITUTION 903
throng of cases, originating in Jacobson, imposes a figurative “ceiling” for individuals
wishing to assert an autonomy interest in obtaining medical treatment.244 The state,
in defending its ban on CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing, would certainly cite to the
reasoning in Jacobson. CRISPR/Cas9 prohibitions fall in line with the Court’s jus-
tification for their constitutionality: protecting the public from potentially harmful
treatments. As a result, the Court would defer fact-finding to the legislature, the branch
best suited to make a determination whether germline editing was sufficiently safe
for public use.
Jacobson is considered the “seminal”245 opinion in health-related cases. The
plaintiff challenged Massachusetts’s compulsory vaccination law, claiming the law
was “hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health
in such [a] way as to him seems best . . . .”246 The Court entertained his argument and
saw its merits, but concluded the law was sufficiently justified by the state’s interest
in protecting the population’s health.247 Massachusetts, as the ultimate arbiter over
questions of public necessity, could invoke its police power to compel individuals
into medical treatment.248 It is important to note that the Court afforded the legisla-
ture this power.249 Moreover, the legislature could determine what was conducive to
public health “whether it [is] in fact or not.”250 The Court thus applied rational basis
review, the easiest standard to overcome, to public health measures.251 Jacobson’s
central holding hasn’t been seriously challenged to this day, solidifying the public
health justification in contemporary constitutional law.
When confronted with individual claims for unapproved medicine, the Supreme
Court adopted the custom of deferring to the legislature. In United States v.
Rutherford,252 terminally ill cancer patients sought access to a drug called Laetrile.253
The FDA listed Laetrile as a “new drug[,]” had not yet found evidence of its “safe
and effective use,” and, consequently, had not approved it for distribution.254 The
District Court created an exception for terminally ill patients because the drugs
could not be unsafe to them since their condition led to death regardless.255 The
244 See, e.g., id.
245 Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 296 (quoting Wendy E. Parnet et al.,
Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health—100 Years After Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652 (2005)).
246 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
247 Id. at 35.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 27 (“The good and welfare of the Commonwealth, of which the legislature is pri-
marily the judge, is the basis on which the police power rests in Massachusetts.”).
250 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
251 See id. 27–35.
252 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
253 Id. at 548.
254 Id. at 546.
255 Id. at 551.
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Supreme Court rejected this argument.256 Instead, it ruled that to grant the exception
would “deny the [state’s] authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual . . . .”257
It then held the state legislature was “entitled to substantial deference”258 over regulating
medication. Similarly, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative
(OCBC),259 the Court refused to recognize a right to medicinal cannabis even when
the individual suffered from a life-threatening condition.260 A more recent case also
involved obtaining a non-FDA approved drug. The D.C. Circuit in Abigail Alliance v.
Von Eschenbach261 considered whether a terminally ill individual held the right to
treatment that “met a lower evidentiary hurdle with respect to safety and efficacy.”262
Unlike in Rutherford, the FDA’s initial approval process revealed the drug had
potential for therapeutic benefit.263 The finding, however, was not enough to perme-
ate the public health ceiling; the Court refused to recognize a fundamental right in
accessing such treatment, borrowing the “history and tradition” framework from
Glucksberg.264 It even rejected a medical necessity defense, as that exception “re-
mains controversial and cannot override a value judgment already determined by the
legislature . . . .”265 Such decisions continue to endorse “the Court’s historical
solicitude for the legislature’s ability to freely exercise its police powers to protect
the public health.”266
The Supreme Court would uphold a legislative ban on CRISPR/Cas9 germline
editing as an exercise of the state’s discretion over public health. Much like in
Jacobson, the state could invoke its police power to protect the public against its
potentially harmful effects. Safety issues are the most relevant issue today.267 But even
if these safety issues are mostly resolved through clinical testing, CRISPR/Cas9
carries additional concerns, the fear of positive eugenics being the most salient
example. The August 2017 germline experiment already showed the practice could
be safe and therapeutic.268 But even comprehensive, peer-reviewed conclusions of
CRISPR/Cas9’s immediate safety would not alleviate every safety concern. For one,
subjects might not develop harmful side effects until generations later.269 As of this
256 Id. at 552.
257 Id. at 557–58.
258 Id. at 553.
259 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
260 Id. at 494.
261 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
262 Id. at 699.
263 See id. The FDA allows use of an “investigational drug” where (i) it treats a serious or
life-threatening condition, and (ii) there are no practical alternatives. The FDA has the right
to deny access where it believes there is a material risk of additional illness or injury. Id.
264 Id. at 697 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
265 Id. at 708.
266 Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 302.
267 See Belluck, supra note 1; Ledford, CRISPR Fixes, supra note 54.
268 Belluck, supra note 1.
269 See Ledford, CRISPR Fixes, supra note 54.
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writing, there are no accepted ethical means to fully resolve the safety issues until
individuals (and even their offspring) are exposed to the treatment and are observed
for long periods. Second, as in Abigail Alliance, courts afford the legislature almost
absolute power to deny access to private treatment, even where the treatment exhibits
some signs of therapeutic benefit before FDA approval.270 Applying rational basis re-
view, the Court also would not question the efficacy of the legislature’s fact-finding
of CRISPR/Cas9. The entire scientific, legal, and bioethical community could over-
whelmingly endorse the practice and the Court would regardless uphold the legislative
regulation. As a new and unsanctioned medical treatment, the public health ceiling
ensures the question of CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing merits legislative deference.
Deferential treatment produces several positive outcomes. First, legislatures are
more adept at and can marshal greater resources for fact-finding than the courts.271
In an issue as divisive and complex as CRISPR/Cas9 genetic engineering, its legal
treatment turns in large part on the facts presented to the legislature. These facts
would presumably include not only medical outcomes, but also the opinions of bio-
ethicists and legal scholars surrounding the procedure’s ethical status and social
consequences.272 The legislature is best suited to resolve issues surrounding “social
fact,”273 as they are representative bodies with diverse backgrounds.274 Second, the
population’s perspectives on genetic engineering are bound to change with time as
the practice becomes increasingly mainstream. A judicial decision on the matter
would only cement the prevailing views at the time the Court issues the opinion.
Legislatures are more responsive to shifting perspectives on medical advances and
can “revisit and revise previous legislative decisions as necessary to adapt them to
changing factual circumstances.”275 We can imagine a society warming up to the
idea of CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing as an effective means to eradicating genetic
270 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697. The FDA is the federal agency most likely to
oversee CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing regulation. It has control over gene-therapy transfers,
especially those that replace DNA components. However, because human embryos are not
considered legal persons, the FDA would have to adjust its jurisdiction to include sources
that would eventually become legal persons. See Barnett, supra note 18, at 577–78 (detailing
how the FDA could one day regulate CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing).
271 See Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 333 (“[L]egislatures, unlike courts,
have vast resources for fact gathering, including large staffs and considerable funds designated
for precisely that purpose; subpoena power; and the ability to take as much time as necessary
to compile all the relevant information.”).
272 Legislatures often preclude purely ethical opinions or “moral judgments that mas-
querade as objective fact” from their fact-finding review. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking
Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2009). However, scien-
tists and bioethicists would probably succeed in admitting facts as to CRISPR/Cas9's potential
impacts on social inequality and other objectively measurable outcomes. Id. at 9.
273 Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 334.
274 See id.
275 Id. (citing Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review:
A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1180 (2001)).
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diseases from the populace. Given its affordability and accessibility, those who previ-
ously claimed the procedure amounted to “playing God”276 might instead see it as a
development in human progress. Advances in medicine are usually fraught with anxiety
against unknown effects.277 It is therefore crucial to resolve these issues via the demo-
cratic process. Given mankind’s troubled history with eugenics,278 perhaps society is
now in a position to learn from its mistakes and halt another slide into moral abyss.
C. The Problem of Creating Disability
By deferring to the legislature, courts avoid answering the question of whether
or not there is a right to engineer a disability through CRISPR/Cas9. The intuitive
response questions the parent’s incentives: why would anyone want to create an
impairment?
The implied purpose of genetic engineering technologies is to remove impair-
ments and give children a more prosperous, less burdensome future.279 The motiva-
tions to create a disability, rather than remove one, are beyond the scope of this
Note. This issue is one the Supreme Court would ultimately have to address if it
found a fundamental right in germline editing. The Court would find itself running
into more problems than solutions. What counts as a “disability?” Who decides? Can
we forbid this practice without devaluing those with preexisting genetic defects?
Shawna Benston introduced and detailed this subject in her article CRISPR, a
Crossroads in Genetic Intervention: Pitting the Right to Health against the Right to
Disability.280 Benston highlights the many issues associated with engineering dis-
abilities through CRISPR/Cas9.281 Her article presents the issue as a normative one,
inseparable from our social and legal perspectives on disability, the right to health,
and what constitutes “harm.”282 Other legal scholars have pointed out the difficulty
in defining a “disability,” sometimes separating the question in medical, social, and
civil rights models.283 Benston ultimately endorses an approach that would allow a
276 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 51, at 124; Ellison, supra note 6, at 610;
Patterson, supra note 81, at 914.
277 See Cucci, supra note 125, at 419; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 51, at 143.
278 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 554; Kevin Wang, CRISPR and the Future of Genome
Engineering: A Bold New World, 10 INTERSECT 2, 8 (2017).
279 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 554 (“CRISPR advocates are enthusiastic about its
promise for correcting mutations for serious genetic diseases.”).
280 Shawna Benston, CRISPR, A Crossroads in Genetic Intervention: Pitting the Right to
Health Against the Right to Disability, 5 LAWS 1 (2016). For further discussion on this issue,
focused instead on preimplantation genetic diagnoses, see Smolensky, supra note 169, at 299
(discussing the dilemma as applied to the PGD procedure).
281 See Benston, supra note 280, at 3–4.
282 See id. at 6–9 (highlighting the different definitions of “disability” by the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the United Nations’s Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (UNCRPD)).
283 See Hensel, supra note 120, at 146–50.
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parent to create these genetic changes as an essential element of individual auton-
omy.284 Our concept of “harm” is ever-changing and we should be wary of when the
present conception unduly interferes with our individual autonomy:
[T]he law’s protections encompass not only individuals with un-
avoidable disability but also individuals who abstain from medical
cures, individuals whose parents decline medical interventions on
their behalf, and even individuals whose disability was engineered
by themselves or their parents. . . . [I]n a society where identities
and communities are actively reconstituting themselves around
what were previously understood as “disabilities,” the legal and
ethical understanding of “harm” becomes increasingly tentative.285
In addition, Benston points out that the debate centers around whether the child is
“harmed” if the parent chooses the child’s disability as a necessary condition of the
child’s existence.286 In other words, is the child’s life with the disability worse than
no life at all? Benston argues the answer depends on what she calls the “subjunctive-
threshold interpretation of harm.”287
The Court dodges these thorny dilemmas by deferring to the legislature.288 The
Court would concur the state legislatures are best suited to make this determination.
Much like the more general question of whether to permit CRISPR/Cas9 germline
editing, the disability issue invokes moral and political debates that are best resolved
through a democratic process. First, the Court would have limited precedent to re-
solve this issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to tackle the predicament
when, in one of the first “wrongful birth” cases, it wrote “[a] court cannot say what
defects should prevent an embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the
opportunity to terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can support a
cause for action.”289 The New York Court of Appeals expressed unwillingness to
even approach the issue.290 Although there have since been a number of “wrongful
life” cases,291 they fall outside the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. As state tort actions,
the Court can only rely on them as secondary authority.
284 See Benston, supra note 280, at 4.
285 Id. at 3.
286 See id. at 8–9.
287 Id. at 9.
288 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 19–20 (1905); Hill, The Constitutional
Right, supra note 191, at 287–89, 297–98, 302.
289 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967).
290 See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Whether it is better never
to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery
more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians.”).
291 See Hensel, supra note 120, at 161 (noting that the courts usually reject “wrongful life”
claims on the ground that life is better than no life at all).
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Most importantly, the legislature is more responsive to shifting norms and atti-
tudes regarding what constitutes “harm” and, consequently, a “disability.”292 Much
like in the overall question of whether to permit CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing,
legislatures can more quickly modify laws in response to changing conceptions of
“disability.” “[W]hereas a court’s judgment is ossified in legal precedent as consti-
tuting a quasi-legal determination, often without any mechanism for reopening an
issue of legislative fact previously decided, legislatures can revisit and revise previous
legislative decisions as necessary to adapt them to changing factual circumstances.”293
The issue sways with public opinion and may be out of reach even to the scientific
community.294 The Supreme Court’s historical position, as a bastion of permanent
resolution, does not suffice to meld this normative divide.
CONCLUSION
CRISPR/Cas9 technology has been aptly described as a “genetic revolution.”295
The social, economic, and moral implications of genetic engineering are bound to
produce groundbreaking consequences.296 The normative upheaval may one day rival
that of the industrial revolution in modern world history. We are at the dawn of
separating the science from the fiction, from reading Brave New World297 less as fable
and more as stark prophecy. Faced with such a societal transformation, we should
at least begin to consider how to calibrate CRISPR/Cas9 engineering in our existing
legal framework. Before implementing a categorical ban, legislatures should take into
account scientific, legal, and bioethical views on the practice. More importantly, the
Supreme Court must approach the issue with caution and foresight.
Because CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing is so near to the clinical testing phase,
a parent may soon assert a fundamental right in its use. She would have a convincing
argument. The Court has long protected procreative rights, especially concerning an
individual’s decision regarding if and how to raise a child. However, neither the right
to privacy nor a right to make medical treatment choices elevates CRISPR/Cas9 use
to a full-fledged right. The protections within the right to privacy apply only to the
decision of whether to have a child, not the child’s genetic disposition. In addition,
292 See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
293 Hill, The Constitutional Right, supra note 191, at 334 (citing Neal Devins, Congressional
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169,
1169–70, 1179 (2001)).
294 See Benston, supra note 280, at 7.
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the Court almost always defers to the legislature when confronted with unapproved
medical treatments. It invokes the police power of the state, coupled with the state’s
interest in protecting public welfare, to apply a rational basis review to these cases.
Legislative deference leads to the most beneficial outcomes. The legislature is the
best suited to make these complex judgments, and it is responsive to changing atti-
tudes. Although the Court would not supply a constitutional safeguard, the individ-
ual certainly always has the ballot box. In the meantime, we will have to settle for
our genes the way they are.
